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davidl2 wrote:
Yes - I think Steve's correct.
But we'll need a none-HTML PUrifier solution for 1.0 as well.
Yes - I think Steve's correct.
But we'll need a none-HTML PUrifier solution for 1.0 as well.
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skenow wrote:
Just wondering - is this something we can address with HTMLPurifier?
Just wondering - is this something we can address with HTMLPurifier?
There is a bit of a problem with our fix - once in system admin, all the functions redirect to modules/system/admin.php.. I think this is also the login problem on the latest revision.
Ah glad that DJ's used Vaughan's fix - or something rather like it.
Sadly seemed to forget to credit the source for this.... but I'm sure that was just a slip of memory.
Yup and should you need to give them group admin access without being able to modify the main admin group you could use Kaotik Group Manager module.
For sites you run for clients, I suggest creating another user group that gives them the admin access they need and not placing them in the Webmasters group. Then you can set the version checker to only be visible to the webmasters and not to the client admins. 1.1 has a new feature that makes this easier to do - in the past the Groups module served this purpose.
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I agree with this, but it should also be a little discrete for those running sites for clients.
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I think you are giving to much atention to this. If an hacker gains admin access it could use the blocks to inject php code so Why even care in protecting this? And talking about modules, there is 0 protection for sql injection in their admin areas. Best step is done in protector setting admin acess to specific IP's.
On the idea of a public security mailing list, I think we can and should build this into the core - our version checker gives us the ability to feed information about version updates to all users. This could be expanded to include hot fixes like this one. This would give us much better coverage of the install base than a mailing list would - people might not subscribe, email addresses might change, the webmaster might change, but an active site will always be able to use the version checker.
Sorry, I miss this thread.
We already have a function in the core to fix this. I add this function when I created the content manager but perhaps we can merge both to make a better solution.
We can only set the example and work for the best
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phppp wrote:
The "vuln" has been reported and discussed a couple of times and the conclusion made by XOOPS dev team at the moment was that it is not an valid vuln thus won't fix.
However, to keep XOOPS elegant, the code will definitely be improved in future releases.
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On the idea of a public security mailing list, I think we can and should build this into the core
Any opportunity we have to make any part of the core more secure I think is worth the effort to do so. Any single vulnerability may not appear to present a high risk, but we have seen otherwise. The 'minor' weakness may be leveraged in combination with another 'minor' weakness and present a serious problem. Kudos for the quick response to all these!
On the idea of a public security mailing list, I think we can and should build this into the core - our version checker gives us the ability to feed information about version updates to all users. This could be expanded to include hot fixes like this one. This would give us much better coverage of the install base than a mailing list would - people might not subscribe, email addresses might change, the webmaster might change, but an active site will always be able to use the version checker.
but we've seen constantly how mikhail gained admin privileges and then assigned users to admin group.
now i understand that this exploit is only possible if the user is admin, but if such a user was given admin, then it would be possible.
cracking is not just about hacking code and exploiting vulnerabilities to gain access, crackers use various tactics (call it social hacking if you must) where they become friendly with users in order to gain trust!! but as soon as their guard is down.. hey presto.
and yes if a user has gained admin, then that is a whole different issue of security.. and yes we should try to improve sanitation for admin functions & queries also.
if it's not important in admin, then it's not important in the installer either, so why fix security issues with the installer when that is only used to install and then should be removed from the server??
in essence, we should strive to remove all issues whether they are directly exploitable or whether they *could* potentially be used to exploit under certain conditions.
something with potential, could in future become a problem.. if we remove that potential, we save ourselves more work in the future if that potential escalates.
At the end of the day, Protector module is a must have, but users are wholly reliant upon it, and this should not be the case, protector module should only be a secondary protection measure, the core *must*/*should* always be the primary means of protection.*/
Trabis - you are quite right, but it doesn't harm to make sure things are as secure as possible.
As for module admin - this is something we need to address with future Impress-specific modules... perhaps some way to limit what they are required to access would be a useful area to look at.
Block abuse: I agree. This is an area that JMorris brought to Skalpa's attention prior to his need to move away from core development, so yes - it's an issue which has been of concern for sometime.
I believe that Vaughan's work on Purifier will give some possibilities on how this can be prevented from abuse in 1.2 onwards.
I think you are giving to much atention to this. If an hacker gains admin access it could use the blocks to inject php code so Why even care in protecting this? And talking about modules, there is 0 protection for sql injection in their admin areas. Best step is done in protector setting admin acess to specific IP's.
The essencial is keep admin access Secure and being that the first barriage we should not care about the rest.